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Many of us are concerned with teaching argument construction and analysis. We
utilize various approaches, some classical (Plato's Euthydemus (Rouse 1973), Aristotle's
Topics (Forster 1960) and Refutations (Forster 1955)), some more recent (Suzette Haden
Elgin's work on verbal self-defense (especially her discussions of lying (1993a, Ch. 8)
and "Writing in Code" (1993b, 103-105)), Blair and Johnson's Logical Self-Defense
(1983)). This concern is central for many of us who teach critical thinking as
philosophers, since much of our field consists of argument and response. The task
becomes daunting when we consider how obscure much philosophy is. Moreover, there is
a tradition of deliberately writing to mislead.
This enterprise of writing in a deliberately misleading way is not exclusive to
philosophy (for business applications, see Elgin 1993b, 103-105), but it is there; and,
according to Leo Strauss's Persecution and the Art of Writing (1952, 1988),1 it is found
among important philosophers, e.g., Plato (Strauss, Ch. 1), Maimonides (Strauss, Chs. 12, and Ch. 3, "The Literary Character of the Guide for the Perplexed.") and Judah HaLevi
(Strauss, Ch. 4, "The Law of Reason in the Kuzari"). They wrote when philosophers
risked death, exile, or imprisonment for advancing certain views. Some continue with
secret writing wherever societies, audiences, authors, or truths need to be protected in a
way that reveals insights to just those readers with the ability to understand and apply
them with care.
In this essay, I provide an explanation of secret writing, reviewing its goals and
methods, basing my analysis on Strauss and Elgin. I then suggest how some ILCT
analyses with their concern for audience, enthymeme, and pragmatics, can lead us toward
recognizing secret writing, aiding us in the problematic task of analyzing such
deliberately misleading discourse. I will consider three examples, taken from Plato's
Meno (Grube 1981), from Maimonides Guide (Friedlander 1956; Pines 1963), and from
HaLevi's Kuzari (Hirschfeld 1964; Heinemann 1977). Then, in conclusion, I will review
the way I teach this material in my ILCT course, and other philosophy courses, and then
seek criticisms and suggestions.

Secret Writing
A definition of secret writing consistent with the work of Maimonides, HaLevi,
and Strauss is writing that is deliberately misleading or opaque to some readers (the
exoteric audience), while at the same time clear or accessible to just those readers with
the ability to understand and apply the writing with care (the esoteric audience).2
There are at least three kinds of goals of secret writing: protective, pedagogical,
1
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and political. Let us remind ourselves that theological and political structure were united
in the western and near eastern worlds until quite recently (some would say they are still
united), and that the response to doctrinally incorrect teaching has included (and in some
places still includes) excommunication (and resultant disemployment), imprisonment,
and execution. A thinker whose views do not square with the authorities may then be
motivated to express these views in a way which seems (at the exoteric level) not to
contradict or even to accord with those authorities, while at the same time communicating
the more dangerous views or information at a more subtle level (the esoteric). This will
serve to protect the secret teaching from some while revealing it to others; it will protect
the authors from excommunication and unemployment; it will keep them and their
students out of jail and away from the gallows (or stoning, or flames, or drowning, etc.).
If their researches have led them to truth, it may even protect the truth.
Pedagogical goals overlap the protective, in that students' survival is a normal
condition of their learning. Furthermore, secret writing is one way to share
philosophically challenging materials with students who are ready for them while at the
same time not undermining the faith or psychological stability of students who might
endanger themselves or others when they encounter such teachings.3
Moreover, the student who struggles to extract the secret teaching from a
deliberately misleading text learns to read carefully and suspiciously, paying attention to
subtle hints as well as broad trends. Such a student will become more sensitive to any
contradiction or problem with the text, in hopes that more careful study will reveal an
insight behind or beyond the contradiction. The student will read a secret writer like
Maimonides the way that writer reads scripture, on the assumption that the text is written
one way to guide the many superficial readers, while at the same time written another
way to guide the carefully prepared readers. Working through the text in this way, the
student comes to be able to read more carefully and critically, and, if the occasion calls
for it, to speak and write more carefully as well.
Political motivations may have, as indicated above, to do with the protection of
the practitioners and institutions of learning. There may also be attempts to gently steer
the political order in such a way as to support secret writers in their enterprise. At a more
immediate practical level, such writing can allow secret writers to publish their work, and
remain respected and employed as academics and teachers while obscuring what many
would take to be subversive implications of their teachings. Again, we remind ourselves
that societies whose social order rests on certain theological political teachings may be at
risk when these teachings are called into question.
Given its deliberately cryptic nature, secret writing presents problems for ILCT
analyses:
1.Problems of decoding complicate the need to interpret an argument before
criticizing it. With secret writing, decoding the text is complicated by difficulties
in applying the principle of charity. Whenever we are presented with text
containing what may be an argument, the principle of charity leads us to first
determine if it is fair to take the text as offering an argument, then leads us to
reconstruct as fairly as we can the argument it offers. This already complicated
and delicate matter is made even more difficult by a suspicion of secret writing,
since things which we normally take to be indications of bad arguments (e.g.,
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various fallacies, contradictions, misrepresentations and misquotations of texts,
and quotations out of context) may serve only as pointers to the real argument,
and furthermore need to be ignored if we can somehow determine that the author's
competence does not allow the careful reader to accept these flaws as accurate
representations of the author's positions. For example, it means one thing if one
relatively ignorant of scripture conflates verses from Genesis concerning the tree
of life with verses concerning the tree of knowledge. In such a case, we would
deem the misrepresentation of the text a matter of incompetence. If Strauss, on
the other hand, were to offer a similar conflation in his introduction to Pines'
translation of the Guide of the Perplexed,4 we might wonder what he's trying to
tell us.
2.If we are successful at interpreting the argument, moral issues arise concerning
the issue of what might be called secret writer – competent reader confidentiality.
Concerning (1) interpretation, probably the greatest challenge to the ILCT analyst
is the extra work involved in applying informal logical analyses to secret writing. Given
secret writing's tendency to use non-present texts to make its points, the frequent
involvement of allusions to literatures in other languages, and assumptions of background
that the reader may not initially bring to the text, secret writing presents significant
challenges of "extra homework and background research." This problem is not unique to
secret writing. Many disciplines require special training of those who would criticize
their texts. Here the challenges are exacerbated by what at times is deliberate
misrepresentation.
Yet, at times, interpretation seems possible, and problems may arise concerning
(2), "sharing the secret." This, on occasion, may indeed be problematic, e.g., when the
interpretation reveals a way to poison the water supply of a city, or to spread a serious
disease. I would suggest, however, that most of the time, at least with the well known
philosophical examples of secret writing, such as the work of Maimonides, Strauss, or
HaLevi, the secrets can not be unequivocally revealed due to the very problematic nature
of these texts.
To put it bluntly, there are so many credible yet inconsistent interpretations of
these texts that one more, even if the most accurate, will be lost in the sea of
disinformation created by the others.5 This forces students to judge for themselves which
interpretations fare best, and when they do so, they will have to confront the original texts
themselves; furthermore, interpreters of secret writing may be themselves engaged in
secret writing in these very interpretations. This is clear in Maimonides' case; for his
Guide6 is, among other things, a secret writing interpretation of scripture that takes
scripture as secret writing. Thus, the careful student needs to ask of any writing about
secret writing whether or not it that interpretation or discussion is itself secret writing.
Again, the students/readers will have to address these issues themselves. We can tell
them what we have discovered some secret writing means, but that does not mean that
they will understand. If it were that simple to communicate difficult truths, teaching
would be an easy profession indeed, as any student who heard a lecture would then
understand the material.
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Some ILCT analyses with their concern for audience, enthymeme, and
pragmatics, can lead us toward recognizing secret writing, aiding us in the problematic
task of analyzing such deliberately misleading discourse. This can be illustrated by
examples taken from Plato, HaLevi, and Maimonides.

The Three Examples
Plato's Meno
A student sensitive to the role of audience and the nature of dialogue will realize
reading the Meno that, as in many dialogues, there are multiple targets of the chief
interlocutor's (in this case, Socrates') attempts at persuasion. Here, we may encounter
Socrates' partners in the dialogue text (primarily Meno and his slave; but also Anytus)
and Plato's partner outside the text, namely the reader.
Let us recall that the motivation of the strange argument from recollection in the
Meno is Meno's challenge to Socrates about the possibility of coming to knowledge
through argument, a particularly pointed challenge when directed at Socrates who claims
to lack the knowledge he seeks. If you don't know what it is, Meno asks, how can you
look for it and how will you recognize it if you find it? (Meno 80d) In reply, Socrates
asks Meno to watch Socrates engage in dialogue with one of Meno's slaves, who has
never studied geometry. In what is generally understood to be an argument for the
recollection of knowledge acquired in a previous life, Socrates then asks the slave
questions about how to construct a square twice the size of an original square whose side
has a length of 2. Through successive questions, Socrates first leads the slave to realize
that the slave does not know the answer, and then through further questioning, the slave
comes to a more adequate response.7
Several things should be noted:
(1) If this is not secret writing then the argument for recollection does not really
answer the Meno question. It only moves it back one step as suggested by some of our
better students and by Augustine in "The Teacher" (Augustine 1983, 20-33). When the
answer is given that we acquired this knowledge in a previous existence, the question
remains, how did we acquire it there?
(2) Furthermore, some might argue that the recollection of forms argument of the
Meno is inadequate inasmuch as it is based on a theory of forms which does not sustain
Plato's own criticism in the dialogue Parmenides (Cornford 1973, 920-946).8
(3) And, there is Socrates' hedge:
I do not insist that my argument is right in all other respects, but I would contend
at all costs both in word and deed as far as I could that we will be better men,
braver and less idle, if we believe that one must search for things one does not
know, rather than if we believe that it is not possible to find out what we do not
know and that we must not look for it (Meno 86b; Cornford 76).
(4) The initial problem is a trick designed to undermine the painful effort to
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acquire knowledge. If the trick succeeds with some people, it results in their giving up
this quest. If the demonstration only succeeds in showing that someone who makes an
effort can gain knowledge it has, at least to that extent, responded to the challenge.
The careful student of informal logic, trained to notice hedges in a variety of
contexts (Blair and Johnson's Logical Self-Defense, for example, addresses hedges in
"Watch for Weasel Words," in their analysis of advertising (1983, 253-255)), should
notice Socrates' statement, "I do not insist that my argument is right in all other respects,"
and wonder about the peculiar constructive ad hominem9 argument Socrates is offering
here (Kagan, 1988).

Maimonides' demonstration of textual competence in defense of his claim about the role
of contradictions in his work
In his "Introductory Remarks," Maimonides addresses the issue of contradictions
in a text (Friedlander 1956, 9-11). He explains that these can occur in a work due to
seven reasons. He states that in the Guide, contradictions will result from causes 5 or 7:
The fifth cause is traceable to the use of a certain method adopted in teaching and
expounding profound problems. Namely, a difficult and obscure theorem must
sometimes be mentioned and assumed as known, for the illustration of some
elementary and intelligible subject which must be taught beforehand, the
commencement being always made with the easier thing. The teacher must
therefore facilitate, in any manner which he can devise, the explanation of those
theorems, which have to be assumed as known, and he must content himself with
giving a general though somewhat inaccurate notion on the subject. It is, for the
present, explained according to the capacity of the students, that they may
comprehend it as far as they are required to understand the subject. Later on, the
same subject is thoroughly treated and fully developed in its right place
(Friedlander, 10).
…Seventh cause: It is sometimes necessary to introduce such metaphysical
matter as may partly be disclosed, but must partly be concealed; while, therefore,
on one occasion the object which the author has in view may demand that the
metaphysical problem be treated as solved in one way, it may be convenient on
another occasion to treat it as solved in the opposite way. The author must
endeavor, by concealing the fact as much as possible, to prevent the uneducated
reader from perceiving the contradiction (Friedlander, 10).
. . . Any inconsistency discovered in the present work will be found to arise in
consequence of the fifth cause or the seventh (Friedlander, 11).
The question arises, couldn't Maimonides have lost track of the minutiae and
implications of what he was saying in the course of a work as long as the Guide?10 What
evidence does Maimonides give that he can keep track of all these details throughout an
extended work?
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Maimonides repeatedly considers the variations of usage of words in the Aramaic
vocabulary of the Targum Onkelos11 (a standard translation of the Hebrew text of
scripture, used in many synagogues to this day), noting the variations. He goes so far as
to correct the Targum Onkelos for the three times in which (in the translation of a
common verb, raah ("see"), the Targum manuscript at hand is at variance with
Maimonides' hypothesis (Guide, Part One, Ch. 48; Friedlander, 65). Each time
Maimonides does this (in a time when there were no concordances to scripture, nor
computer searches), the reader is given more evidence as to the adequacy of Maimonides'
memory and his ability to maintain a synoptic view of a larger work. Each occasion of
such analysis of an Aramaic term increases the likelihood that Maimonides was able to
keep track of what he is doing.
So then, for example, after linking prophecy and philosophy, when Maimonides
repeatedly cites the common view that women cannot do either, he should be aware of
what he has said, as he is surely aware of what scripture has said (since, among other
things, he knows, the Aramaic translation so well). Yet, after making this commonly
accepted (Aristotelian?) point, Maimonides is careful to repeatedly inform the reader that
only three people reached the highest levels of prophecy, viz. Moses, Aaron, and Miriam.
Towards the end of the work, he shows how the sages were aware of her status, and
suggests that scripture itself addresses her situation differently because she is female.
(See Guide, Part III, Ch. 51; Friedlander 390-391.)

HaLevi's use of language to deny what he apparently supports.
Judah HaLevi's twelfth century work, The Book of the Kuzari: The Book of
Argument and Proof in Defense of a Despised Religion,12 like the Meno, takes the form
of a philosophical dialogue. The dialogue is motivated by the situation of the eighth
century (Schirmann 2002, 2003) Kuzari king who "dreamt his way of thinking was
agreeable to God, but not his way of acting, and was commanded in the same dream to
seek the God pleasing work . . ." (Kuzari I.1;. Hirschfeld 1964, 35-36). After dreaming
this dream, the King of the Khazars summons first a neoplatonic philosopher,13 then a
Christian, then a Moslem, to see which of the three has the truth he seeks. He initially
declines to interview a Jew since Jews are a despised minority (Kuzari, Part I.4;
Hirschfeld, 40). The King ends up rejecting each of the three for different reasons.
He rejects the Neoplatonist philosopher, although impressed with his ideas, since
the king does not see in the philosopher's words a specific guide to action (Kuzari, I.2;
Hirschfeld, 39), and since it is the quest for the right deeds that motivates him.
The Christian claims about the virgin birth, the incarnation, and the trinity he
finds illogical (Kuzari, I.5; Hirschfeld, 42).
The Moslem sets forth the Quran as the central miracle of Islam. The King
replies: “Although your book may be a miracle, as long as it is written in Arabic,
a non-Arab, as I am, cannot perceive its miraculous character; and even if it were
read to me, I could not distinguish it from any other book written in the Arabic
language” (Kuzari, I.6; p. 43).
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The Islamic argument is, as it were, too demanding – one would need to learn
Arabic, a difficult language indeed, to evaluate it.
And so, the King (who eventually converts to Judaism) is finally persuaded to
seek out a Rabbi, an exponent of the despised faith of Judaism, since the teachings of its
Torah were cited as evidence by both the Christian and the Moslem.
But it should be noted that later in the text, the Rabbi offers an interesting
argument concerning the Mishnah:
. . . the Mishnah contains a large amount of pure Hebrew which is not borrowed
from the Bible. It is greatly distinguished by terseness of language, beauty of
style, excellence of composition, and the comprehensive employment of
homonyms, applied in a lucid way, leaving neither doubt not obscurity. This is so
striking that every one who looks at it with genuine scrutiny must be aware that
mortal man is incapable of composing such a work without divine assistance, only
he who is hostile to it, who does not know it, and never endeavored to read and
study it, hearing some general and allegorical utterances of the Sages deems them
senseless and defective, just as one who judges a person senseless and defective
after meeting him, without having conversed with him for any length of time
(Kuzari, III.67; pp 191-192).
It looks like the argument from the Quran has occurred again in a different guise.
Nonetheless, it does seem clear that both arguments have been challenged, given the
difficulty most of us find in learning a Semitic language. As with many consistency
arguments, what works with one side of the argument may work with the other side as
well.
If the Rabbi's argument has merit, then a text in a foreign and difficult language
may be evidence of divine inspiration and worthy of the study which would make it
accessible. A wider audience of non-Arabists like the king may have other languages and
experiences of texts that repaid rereading and suggest a divine source. These other works
may also have this beauty of revelation; perhaps even the Kuzari dialogue itself, which
after all is written in Arabic, and whose original readers, after all, should not share the
King's response to the language of the Quran.
It is interesting to note that many students forget that the Kuzari was written in
Arabic, and thus do not notice the additional layer of meaning in the King's challenge to
the Quran. Yet, students of informal logic and rhetoric learn early to identify the context
of an utterance, and the audience of an argument, in order to understand the role of
presupposition and enthymeme.14
This awareness of context will allow ILCT students to find their way into
multilayered secret writing like HaLevi's. Their familiarity with circumstantial ad
hominem, for example, may lead them to be sensitive to tensions between the existence
of a claim and the possibility of its credible utterance.
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Some ways to address secret writing material in ILCT courses and other philosophy
courses, and some remarks on dangers of secret writing
Probably the most important thing to share with students is the realization that
secret writing may exist, and that when the student is confronted with a suspicious text, it
may be worth considering that possibility. Otherwise, the student is in the position of one
not knowing how to untie a knot due to ignorance of the knot itself.15
I usually introduce my students to the possibility of secret writing by suggesting
how they may have already done some secret writing of their own. I ask them to imagine
themselves in the position of someone who has high ambitions, hoping perhaps to serve
as a judge on one of the higher courts (and therefore wants to get good grades to get into
a good law school). They have been asked to write a final paper on a controversial topic,
say abortion, for an intolerant professor. Short term prudence suggests they pretend to
agree with the professor. Long term prudence and the desire to be able at a later date to
defend their words suggests that they do not agree. What such a student may do is write
a paper which seems to be in agreement with the intolerant professor, who will be forced
to read quickly, in the midst of the deluge of final essays. The paper, on a more careful
reading, will turn out not to be in favor of the professor's doctrine after all. I sometimes
share with the students my knowledge of cases where something like this was done at the
thesis level (changing names and details, of course, to protect privacy).
Sometimes in informal logic courses, and more often in courses where secret
writing plays a significant role (such as a course in Medieval Philosophy or in
Philosophies of Judaism), I assign Strauss's Persecution and the Art of Writing, from
which most of the intratextual advice shared here on reading secret writing is derived.
Having introduced them to the possibility of secret writing and one of its motivations, we
review the other motives discussed earlier in this essay, and then turn to various
techniques for reading secret writing. Some, as indicated above, are the techniques and
concerns used in ILCT and rhetorical studies to consider any kind of writing. Examples
of these techniques and concerns include issues of audience, author and context, the need
to read carefully and critically while looking for arguments, and the need to recognize
enthymemes and presuppositions. If these factors suggest the possibility of secret
writing, I then suggest, following Strauss, that they consider evidence of signposts in the
author's work.
The signposts include any evidence that the author gives about how he or she
reads a text. The instruction the author offers through modeling how to decode and
interpret (especially if the author is addressing someone else's secret writing) may be
applicable to their own writing. Also important are any explicit indications of how they
say one should read.
I urge students to pay attention to built-in protective advantages of writing in
dialogue form, and the parallel advantage (in both dialogues and non-dialogues) of
considering opposing arguments in such a fashion that the essay turns out to work better
as an argument for the opposition.
Then, in the tradition of secret writing with which I am familiar, I recommend
they pay attention to traditional signals and phrases, such as "the intelligent will discern,"
and "those with understanding will understand." For example, HaLevi states (after
describing the problem of the Khazar King):
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This induced him to ponder over the different beliefs and religions, and finally he
became a convert to Judaism together with many other Khazars. As I found
among the arguments of the Rabbi many which appealed to me and were in
harmony with my opinions, I resolved to write them down as they had been
spoken. The intelligent will understand this (Heinemann 1977).

Some Disadvantages and Dangers of Secret Writing
I also try to make students aware of some of the disadvantages and dangers of
secret writing. First of all, by its nature, secret writing is deliberately misleading, and
therefore particularly liable to wrong interpretations. The "safe" exoteric meaning, if any,
can be distorted by readers with enough intelligence to confound it with partially
discerned esoteric meaning. Skill in small amounts, like knowledge, can be a dangerous
thing.
Also, the secret writer can lose her or his best readers if the lower or common
interpretation prevails. Consider, for example, the young Augustine who turned from his
mother's religion when confronted with certain simple interpretations of scripture.16
Another disadvantage concerns how exoteric styles may end up protecting or even
supporting evil regimes and societies. I like discussing this idea in terms of the "Howard
Campbell Problem." Howard Campbell, in Kurt Vonnegut's Mother Night, pretends to be
a virulent Nazi and anti-Semite in order to work from Germany, serving as a racist radio
announcer in order to convey information to the Allies, information which is instrumental
in defeating Germany. Yet he finds, to his chagrin, that no matter how ridiculously and
extremely he presents his hate talk, his Nazi audience finds in it inspiration to continue
their destructive work.
Another danger in learning about secret writing that I warn students about is what
might be called a fallacy of misplaced secrecy or misplaced competence which may
occur when reading non-secret writing as secret writing. Maimonides may contradict
himself due to the fifth and seventh cause, but most of us find ourselves in contradiction
due to the sixth, namely that we have lost track of the implications of earlier statements,
or even have forgotten that we have ever made them.

Seeking criticisms and suggestions
Most of the study I have done in this area involves texts written in Hebrew from a
literary context which has long accepted secret levels of interpretation. (Two of the four
levels of Rabbinic interpretation of scripture, remez and sod, have names that can be
translated as "hint," and "secret.")
I suspect I would be more successful at teaching if those of you who have heard
or read these words about secret writing were to share your criticisms and insights based
on your own experiences of teaching and reading multileveled works with a variety of
students.

9
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Notes
1

For an overview of Strauss's account of the role of secret writing in philosophy, Ch. 1,
"Introduction," and Ch. 2, the title essay, are quite valuable. I have also benefited by the
guidance of Profs. Ellis Rivkin, Alvin Reines, and Patty Stevens.

2

"Persecution, then, gives rise to a peculiar technique of writing, and therewith to a
peculiar type of literature, in which the truth about all crucial things is presented
exclusively between the lines. That literature is addressed, not to all readers, but to
trustworthy and intelligent readers only" (Strauss, p. 25).

3

Consider for example, what happens in Dostoevsky's Crime and Punishment, when the
student Raskolnikov learns that "everything is permitted," and becomes a murderer. In
discussing the dangers of presenting certain material before certain audiences, the
philosopher Al-Ghazali writes, "Indeed, just as the snake-charmer must refrain from
touching the snake in front of his small boy, because he knows that the boy imagines he
is like his father and will imitate him, and must even caution the boy by himself showing
caution in front of him, so the first-rate scholar too must act in similar fashion" (AlGhazali 1983, 275).

4

See Genesis 3.6, Genesis 3:24, and Strauss, "How to Begin to Study the Guide of the
Perplexed," (Pines 1963, xiv, xlv, lvi); see also the end of Maimonides' "Introduction" in
the accompanying Pines' translation (Pines 1963, 20; corresponds to Friedlander, 11), and
the proem to Ch. 1 of the Guide (Pines, 21; corresponds to Friedlander, 13, and Kafah's
Hebrew translation (Kafah 1977, 15, 17)).
5

For a recent treatment of problems raised in the interpretation of the Guide and the
problems raised by Maimonides' explanation of causes of contradiction as they apply to
the Guide, see Yair Lorberbaum's recent work (2002, 711-750). Hs treatment includes
an interesting criticism of Strauss's approach, and offers a key to interpreting
Maimonides' discussion of contradictions in light of features of the original Arabic text.

6

The perplexity alluded to in the Guide's title is that of one who "has been trained to
believe in the truth of our Holy Law, who conscientiously fulfills his moral and religious
duties, and at the same time has been successful in his philosophical studies. Human
reason has attracted him to abide within its sphere; and he finds it difficult to accept as
correct the teaching based on the literal interpretation of the Law. . ." (Friedlander, 2).

7

When I teach this dialogue, I am sometimes fortunate enough as to have a student (who
does not know geometry, and also has not yet read the assignment) answer the questions
Socrates asks of Meno's slave. The results are usually the same as in the dialogue.

8

The present interpretation is somewhat controversial; this is not surprising, given the
perplexing character of the dialogue. As the editors note, "The Parmenides presents a
great difficulty to the reader. The best Platonists differ about its meaning" (920).
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9

By "constructive ad hominem argument " I mean an argument that attempts to show that
the audience will be better people in some way if they accept or act according to a certain
thesis.

10

The Sixth cause of contradiction in a work is that an author is unaware of some
inconsistency implied by a large number of premises scattered throughout the work
(Friedlander, 10).
11

Onkelos' Aramaic translation of scripture is found in many rabbinic and study bibles,
and is used as an authority by many medieval commentators (Greenstein 1984, 213-215).
12

I'm following Isaak Heinemann's translation in his discussion of the Arabic title, which
is to be found on p. 11 of the HaLevi section of Three Jewish Philosophers.
13

This philosopher expresses views which seem to be typical of neoplatonic Aristotelian
philosophers.
14

This is also true for some students of formal logic, who heed the implications of
Quine's words, "For utterances that sound alike can vary in meaning with the occasion of
the utterance" (Quine 1989, 1). See, also, for example, his discussion of the fallacy of
equivocation (Quine, 56-57).
15

" . . . it is not possible to untie a knot of which one does not know." Aristotle,
Metaphysics 995a30, as translated by W.D. Ross (Ross 1941, 716). Also, note the proem
to Strauss's "The Literary Character of the Guide for the Perplexed" (Strauss, 38).
(Thanks to Profs. Hamner Hill, Charles Kelly, and John McMahon for helping me track
the Strauss reference down.)
16

See Confessions, Book V, section 14 (Augustine 1961, 108 ). Also, note Augustine's
careful discussion of how to read a text in Book XII (of particular interest are his remarks
near the end of the book, when he explains how he would write an important book to be
read different ways by different readers; see section 31, p. 308), especially given the
importance of reading in the work (e.g., "take it and read, " Book VIII , section 12
(Augustine 1961, 177)).
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